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Abstract
This paper examines the issue of whether workers learn productive skills from
their co-workers, even if those skills are unethical. Speci…cally, we estimate whether
Jose Canseco, a star baseball player in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, a¤ected the per-
formance of his teammates by introducing them to steroids. Using panel data, we
show that a player’s performance increases signi…cantly after they played with Jose
Canseco. After checking 30 comparable players from the same era, we …nd that no
other baseball player produced a similar e¤ect. Furthermore, the positive e¤ect of
Canseco disappears after 2003, the year that drug testing was implemented. These
results suggest that workers not only learn productive skills from their co-workers,
but sometimes those skills may derive from unethical practices. These …ndings
may be relevant to many workplaces where competitive pressures create incentives
to adopt unethical means to boost productivity and pro…ts. Our analysis leads
to several potential policy implications designed to reduce the spread of unethical
behavior among workers.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature that stresses the importance of the environment in determining
the outcomes of individuals. Most of this literature is concerned with examining how peers
and environmental factors a¤ect youth behavior regarding their educational achievements,
health, criminal involvement, work status, and other economic outcomes.1 This paper
examines the issue of how workers a¤ect the productivity of other workers. If workers
learn valuable skills and work habits from their co-workers, then “peer e¤ects” between
workers should exist in many work environments. A peer e¤ect across workers could also
result from behavioral considerations such as group norms, peer pressure, shame, and guilt.
Recent work suggests that peer e¤ects between workers are empirically signi…cant.2
The existing literature, however, has not examined whether workers sometimes learn
unethical practices from their co-workers in order to boost their productivity. A high
payo¤ to performance naturally creates incentives to adopt any means necessary to boost
productivity. Given that there is heterogeneity in skill, risk aversion, and moral character,
these incentives will sometimes be strong enough for at least some workers to adopt uneth-
ical practices which enhance productivity. Once one worker adopts questionable methods,
another worker may consider it more socially acceptable (see Goldstein et al., 2008) and
hence more likely to follow suit, perhaps with the help of (knowledge transfer from) the
initial worker. In some cases, competitive pressures may lead others to follow in order
to get ahead, or perhaps just to stay even with other workers who are adopting similar
techniques.
This mechanism is a plausible explanation for the apparent widespread use of performance-
enhancing drugs in baseball, cycling, and track and …eld. Outside the world of sports, this
di¤usion process could show up through the adoption of dubious accounting methods,
questionable ethics by lawyers, unscrupulous practices by mortgage brokers, political cor-
1See Angrist and Lang (2004), Guryan (2004), Hoxby (2000), Sacerdote (2001), Zimmermann (2003),
Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001), Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003), Oreopoulos (2003), Jacob (2004),
Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow (2004), Gould, Lavy and Paserman (2004 and 2009).
2See Kandel and Lazear (1992), Ichino and Maggi (2000), Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2002), Falk
and Ichino (2006), Winter (2004), Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005, 2010), Mas and Moretti (2009),
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009), and Gould and Winter (2009).
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ruption, cheating by students, biased reporting by the media, falsi…cation in academic
research, or other ways of skirting legal or ethical requirements. The literature on crime
has found that criminal activity does respond to economic conditions (see Gould, Wein-
berg, and Mustard, 2002). Here, we highlight the idea that in the absence of persistent
monitoring and rigid enforcement of ethical and legal practices, competitive pressures may
lead to a “rat race” among workers to learn unethical behavior from co-workers in order
to boost their productivity. As such, this paper makes a contribution to the recent lit-
erature that has demonstrated that agents do respond to incentives to cheat or engage in
corruption (Duggan and Levitt, 2002; Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Wolfers, 2006; Kuziemko
and Werker, 2006; and Carrell et al., 2008).
To examine the empirical relevance of this issue, we estimate whether Jose Canseco,
one of the leading baseball players in the 1980’s and 1990’s, a¤ected the productivity of
his fellow teammates. In 2005, Canseco wrote a highly controversial book in which he
not only admits to taking steroids throughout his playing career, but also claims to have
personally ignited a contagion of drug use in professional baseball by educating dozens of
teammates on the bene…ts and proper use of steroids.3 In addition, he speci…cally named
six famous power-hitters that he personally injected with steroids when they were team-
mates.4 Naturally, these claims were treated with skepticism, especially since Canseco’s
reputation was tarnished even in his playing days, and he was particularly known for doing
just about anything for money. As a result, no one really knows whether his claims are
true or whether they were part of a publicity stunt to help promote his book.5
3Indeed, taking steroids is not simple. According to Canseco, steroids are e¤ective only if they are
used correctly in conjunction with appropriate doses of human growth hormone, lifting weights, a proper
diet, abstinence from recreational drugs, and cycling on and o¤ the various types of drugs. He writes in
his autobiography that he obtained his human capital on steroid use from extensive reading, talking to
bodybuilders, and years of experimenting on himself. He writes (page 135), “I was the …rst to educate
others about how to use them, the …rst to experiment and pass on what I’d learned, and the …rst to get
contacts on where to get them. I taught which steroid has which e¤ect on the body, and how to mix or
“stack” certain steroids to get a desired e¤ect.”
4Canseco claimed that he shared his knowledge not only with other players, but also with trainers who
would transmit the knowledge throughout the league. He writes (page 211) that: “As soon as the trainers
I talked to started getting involved, the steroid ‡oodgates burst. The players started doing them right
there in the locker room, so openly that absolutely everybody knew what was happening.”
5Even the Mitchell Report (2007) did not give much credence to his testimony, despite the fact that
Canseco was one of the only current or former players who agreed to cooperate with the investigation.
Three of the seven players that Canseco claimed in his book that he personally injected with steroids were
2
This paper analyzes whether there is any empirical evidence to support the notion
that Jose Canseco a¤ected the performance of his teammates by turning them on to steroid
use. The hypothesis is tested using panel data on the performance of baseball players from
1970 to 2009. After controlling for the individual …xed-e¤ect of each player and a rich set
of other control variables (experience, year e¤ects, home ballpark characteristics, division
e¤ects, and managerial quality), the empirical analysis shows that a player’s performance
signi…cantly increases after playing on the same team with Jose Canseco. This result is
especially true for measures of performance like power hitting which are typically a¤ected
by physical strength. However, the results are signi…cant for simple batting performance
as well, where baseball folklore maintains that physical strength is not a dominant factor.
In addition, we …nd that Canseco had a positive e¤ect on the number of innings played
by pitchers, which suggests that Canseco improved the endurance of pitchers on his team.
We also examined wither 30 other comparable players from the same era generated similar
positive e¤ects on their teammates. This analysis reveals no evidence of similar e¤ects
from any other player – thus indicating that Jose Canseco had an unusual in‡uence on the
productivity of his teammates. Furthermore, the positive e¤ect of Canseco disappears
after 2003, the year that drug testing was implemented.
It is important to note that our main results are not driven by a common shock to all
players on the same team, which is always a potential problem in the identi…cation of peer
e¤ects. There are several reasons for this. First, Canseco played on seven di¤erent teams
throughout his career. In fact, the seven players that Canseco claimed to have injected
played on three di¤erent teams with him.6 Second, the positive e¤ect of Canseco on his
peers shows up after they no longer play with him, and therefore, are playing for various
teams in the league. So, the results could not come from a common shock to all players on
one team. Third, as stated above, we found no evidence of peer e¤ects for six power-hitters
not even mentioned in the report (Ivan Rodriguez, Wilson Alvarez, and Dave Martinez). Three of the
other players were cited by the report, but not for evidence provided by Canseco. Canseco also named
other players that he did not personally inject as users, and these players were not mentioned in the report
either (Bret Boone, Tony Saunders, and Brady Anderson).
6McGwire played with Canseco on the Oakland A’s in the late 1980’s; Palmeiro, Gonzalez, and Ro-
driguez played with Canseco on the Texas Rangers in the early 1990’s; Giambi played with Canseco on
the Oakland A’s in 1997; and Alvarez and Martinez played with Canseco on the Tampa Bay Devil Rays
in the late 1990’s.
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who played with Canseco and shared the same coaches and team characteristics, which
refutes the idea that the e¤ect is coming from the team rather than Canseco himself.
Although it is theoretically possible that teams endogenously chose players who
would improve their performance after playing with Canseco, it is di¢cult to explain why
teams would do this regarding Canseco and no other player in the league. In addition, it
is di¢cult to understand why Canseco’s team would systematically trade a player away at
the point where the player’s performance is expected to improve. For all these reasons,
the evidence points strongly in favor of Canseco’s claims that he improved his teammates
by introducing them to steroids.7 It is possible that his teammates bene…ted from his
other qualities (workout habits, batting technique, work ethic, etc.) rather than his human
capital in steroids, but again, it is hard to explain why Canseco is the only player who
a¤ected his teammates through these channels. Overall, the evidence points to the strong
contagion e¤ect of improper behavior which can be generated by one worker when the
incentives to keep up with fellow workers are very strong.
Overall, these …ndings highlight the need for …rms and trade organizations to develop
policies designed to contain the spread of unethical practices among workers. These
policies could attack the phenomenon from two angles. First, policies could be developed
in order to prevent individual workers from engaging in dubious behavior. One way
to achieve this is through stricter monitoring of workers, and raising the severity of the
punishment for those that are caught. The second way to combat the phenomenon is
to create policies that restrict the ‡ow of information about unethical behavior between
workers. Incentives to share information about such practices with other workers could
be reduced by in‡icting severe penalties on the sharing of information. Other alternatives
include rewarding workers for reporting on the unethical behavior of other workers, and
7Two years after Canseco’s book, the Mitchell Report (2007) also made accusations of widespread use
of steroids and human growth hormone in professional baseball. The two main sources of information for
the report came from two trainers (Kirk Radomski and Brian McNamee) who provided evidence that they
supplied 53 players with steroids and human growth hormone. McNamee is directly linked to Canseco,
since they both worked for the Toronto Blue Jays in 1998. McNamee later went on to inject many other
players during his tenure with the New York Yankees, and thus, Canseco has a direct link to the contagion
outlined in the Mitchell Report. In addition, McNamee admits in the report that he consulted with
Canseco on the use of steroids and considered him a knowledgeable expert. See footnote 387 on page 170
of the Mitchell Report.
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to use a form of group punishment – such as punishing the whole …rm for the behavior of
individual workers. Group punishment on the whole …rm would increase the incentives for
…rms to monitor their workers, while producing peer pressure among workers to stay away
from dubious practices. These policy implications are discussed further in the concluding
section.
2 The Data and Background
The data was obtained from the “Baseball Archive” which is copyrighted by Sean Lahman,
and is a freely available on the Internet for research purposes. The data contains extensive
personal and yearly performance information on players, coaches, and teams for every
season of professional baseball. The sample is restricted to the seasons between 1970 and
2009. Pitchers are included in the sample if they pitched at least 10 games in a season,
while non-pitchers are included if they batted at least 50 times in a season. The unit of
observation is the person-year, so all variables are measured at the annual level.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample. The upper portion of the table
presents the means and standard deviations for standard measures of performance by non-
pitchers: home runs, strikeouts (which typically are high if you are trying to hit home
runs), RBIs (runs batted in), batting average (number of hits per time at-bat), slugging
percentage (which is similar to the batting average but takes into consideration the quality
of the hit), intentional walks (which are typically high if you are a dangerous batter), base
on balls (typically high if you are a dangerous batter), steals (typically related to speed, but
Canseco claims that steroids helped him steal by making him faster), errors (in …elding),
number of times at-bat, and number of games played. The sample of non-pitchers is
divided into “power hitters” (those that played a majority of their career at …rst base,
catcher, in the out…elder, or designated hitters) and “position players” (those that played
a majority of their career at second base, third base, or short-stop). The former category
emphasizes batting with power (home runs, slugging percentage, etc.) while the second
one emphasizes …elding skills at the expense of hitting prowess. This pattern is exhibited
in Table 1 which shows that power hitters hit 9.83 home runs per year versus 6.87 for
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position players. The slugging percentage is also considerably higher for power hitters.
Table 1 also shows the means for variables which concern the extent to which players
interacted with Canseco throughout his career. The variable “ever with Canseco” is a
dummy variable for ever playing on the same team with Canseco, while “currently with
Canseco” is a dummy variable for currently being on the same team as Canseco in a given
year. Table 1 indicates the 11 percent of the players in the sample played with Canseco at
some point in their careers, while 1.7 percent were currently playing with him in a given
year.8
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics for pitchers. The standard
indicator of a pitcher’s performance is called the ERA (Earned Run Average).9 A higher
ERA re‡ects poorer performance. The average ERA is 4.26, while 12 percent of the pitchers
played at some point with Canseco and 1.8 percent play concurrently on the same team
with him.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for a list of individual players. The list includes
Jose Canseco, the six power-hitters named by Jose Canseco as players that he personally
injected with steroids (Rafael Palmeiro, Jason Giambi, Mark McGwire, Juan Gonzalez,
Ivan Rodriguez, and Dave Martinez), Ken Caminiti (who admitted that he took steroids
but was not implicated by Canseco and never played with Canseco), and three leading
power hitters from the 1990’s that have never been implicated in any scandal and never
played with Jose Canseco (Ken Gri¤ey Jr., Ryne Sandberg, and Cecil Fielder).10 Like
Canseco, most of these other players were voted “most valuable player” at some point in
their career (Canseco in 1988, Sandberg in 1984, Caminiti in 1996, Gonzalez in 1996 and
1998, Gri¤ey in 1997, Rodriguez in 1999, and Giambi in 2000).
8Only 1.7 percent of the players played with Canseco in a given year because there are 30 teams in
professional baseball (as of 2000), and Canseco played in less than half of the seasons in our sample.
9This measure takes the number of runs that a pitcher allows the opposing team to obtain, and scales
it by the number of innings played, so that it represents the average number of runs which would have
been scored o¤ the pitcher in a full game. The ERA is calculated by: (number of earned runs/innings
pitched)*9. Runs due to defensive errors by other players are not counted, hence the name “earned” run
average.
10In Canseco’s book, he also named pitcher Wilson Alvarez, who is not included in the table because
he is not a hitter. Ken Caminiti was the most valuable player in the National League 1996, but later
admitted that he took steroids throughout his career. He ended his 15 year career in 2001 and died in
2004 of a heart attack. In an interview with Sports Illustrated in 2002, Caminiti estimated that half of
the players in baseball are on steroids. (See Associated Press, May 28, 2002)
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Comparing these players to the overall average, Table 2 reveals a pattern which is
very typical for excellent power hitters: many home runs, very high slugging percentage, a
little better than average batting average, many RBIs, and many strikeouts (since going for
home runs often results in strikes). Also, these players have higher than normal intentional
walks and “base on balls” since the opposing teams often “pitch around” dangerous hitters
to prevent them from getting a home run.
Overall, Table 2 demonstrates that this list of players includes some of the best power
hitters of their generation, although Dave Martinez is perhaps not quite at the same level
as the others. The statistics for Jose Canseco certainly show that he belongs in this elite
group, but he does not stand out among the group as being the absolute best. In the
next section, we examine whether Jose Canseco a¤ected the performance of his peers, and
then we compare the results for Canseco to those obtained by estimating the peer e¤ect
of players who had similar careers and played during the same era (the 10 players listed in
Table 2 plus 20 other players who are among the best home run hitters of all-time).
3 The Empirical Analysis
This section examines how the performance of individual players is a¤ected by coming into
contact with Jose Canseco. Figure 1 presents a naive analysis by showing the mean home
runs for three mutually exclusive categories of power hitting players from 1995-2000 (as
a crude control for year e¤ects): those that never played with Canseco, those that were
playing concurrently with Canseco, and those that played with Canseco in the past. Figure
1 shows that players who played with Canseco in the past have much higher home runs
than those who played with him concurrently, and both of these groups have much higher
home run production than those that never played with him. Figure 2 displays a similar
pattern regarding the slugging percentage – those that played with him are much better
sluggers than those that did not.
This stark pattern could be due to the higher ability levels of players who happened to
play with Canseco in the present and past, or it may be due to the causal e¤ect of Canseco
on his peers. To control for the non-random allocation of players who might have played
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with Canseco over time, all regressions will include individual …xed-e¤ects. Furthermore,
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the e¤ect of Canseco on his peers may be di¤erent between
current and former teammates. Therefore, to allow for the possibility that it may take
a period of time for Canseco to a¤ect the performance of his teammates, the analysis
examines whether there is evidence for an immediate e¤ect of Canseco on the output of
current teammates and whether there is a lingering e¤ect of Canseco on former teammates.
The basic regression equation is the following:
 = 0 + 1(  ) + 2( )
+ + 

 + 3( ) + 
where the performance of player  in year  is a function of a dummy variable for whether
he plays on the same team as Jose Canseco in year  (  ), a dummy
variable for having played with Canseco in the past but not during year  ( ),
the …xed-e¤ect of player  represented by  the year e¤ect for each league 

 (a year
dummy for each year for each of the two leagues), other observable control variables, and
the error term, 11 Separate regressions are run for each performance measure listed in
Table 1. The other control variables include: the slugging percentage in player ’s division
(excluding his own team) in year  which controls for the quality of the pitching and batting
in the team’s division in the same year, the team manager’s lifetime winning percentage
which is an indicator for the quality of the team’s coaching, the ballpark hitting factor which
control for whether the team’s ballpark is easy or di¢cult for batters in year , and the
player’s years of experience and experience squared.12 It is worth noting that the inclusion
of a …xed-e¤ect for each year in each league controls for several common explanations for
why hitting power has increased over time – namely, the dilution of pitching talent due to
the addition of expansion teams into professional baseball and other structural changes.
11If a player played with Canseco in non-consecutive years, the variable for “playing with Canseco”
is equal to 1 for every year starting in the …rst year that the player played with Canseco until the last
year that he played with Canseco. The variable “after Canseco” is equal to one for every year after the
last year that the player played with Canseco. Canseco played with the following teams in the following
years: Oakland Athletics (1985–1992), Texas Rangers (1992–1994), Boston Red Sox (1995–1996), Oakland
Athletics (1997), Toronto Blue Jays (1998), Tampa Bay Devil Rays (1999–2000), and Chicago White Sox
(2001). In 2000, Canseco played 61 games for Tampa Bay and 37 for the New York Yankees, therefore,
he is coded as being only with Tampa Bay that year.
12The results are not sensitive to using the division-level batting average instead of the slugging per-
centage.
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The unobserved ability of player   is controlled for by including …xed-e¤ects for each
player .
The main parameters of interest are 1 and 2, which indicate whether Jose Canseco
a¤ected the performance of his current or former teammates respectively. We model the
potential e¤ect of Canseco on his peers as an intercept e¤ect, since the main factor is
likely to be whether the person takes steroids or not, rather than learning how to inject
steroids over time. Also, the distinction between playing “with Canseco” and playing
“after Canseco” is important since even if a player did learn about steroids from Canseco,
we do not know when he learned about it during his time with Canseco, but we can be
sure that he already acquired the knowledge after playing with Canseco. The inclusion
of a …xed-e¤ect for each player means that we are exploiting variation in performance
levels within the career of each player, rather than exploiting variation in the types of
players that may have played with Canseco over time. In this manner, the empirical
strategy controls for the endogenous personnel decisions of team managers. Therefore,
identi…cation of the parameters of interest comes from seeing whether variation within a
given player’s performance over time deviates from the typical player’s experience pro…le
in a way that is correlated with being a current or former teammate of Jose Canseco.
The basic …xed-e¤ect regressions for all non-pitchers are presented in Table 3. Col-
umn (1) shows that after controlling for all the other variables, playing on the same team
with Canseco had no e¤ect on the home run output of a given hitter (the estimate for 1
is -0.16 with standard error 0.49). However, home run production picks up signi…cantly
after playing with Canseco (the estimate for 2 is 0.97 with standard error 0.44). The
same pattern exists for several other performance measures: strikeouts, RBIs, intentional
walks, and “base-on-balls.” Each of these performance measures increase in a statistically
signi…cant way after playing with Jose Canseco, but rarely are they statistically signi…cant
while playing with Canseco. It is worth noting that an increase in each of these measures
is indicative of a higher performing “power hitter”: more home runs, more strikeouts, and
more attempts by the other team to “pitch around” a dangerous hitter (expressed by more
intentional walks and base-on-balls). This leads us to test whether the e¤ect of Canseco
on his teammates may di¤er according to the position of the player. Table 3 presents
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the p-value on an F-test which tests for the equality of all coe¢cients for “power hitters”
and “position players”, as de…ned above. The results indicate that the coe¢cients are
signi…cantly di¤erent across the two groups for almost all of the outcome measures. As a
result, we now present results for the two groups separately.
Table 4 performs the same analysis in Table 3 after restricting the sample to power
hitters. The results are very similar to Table 3 in terms of signi…cance, but the magnitudes
of the coe¢cients are much bigger for power hitters. The e¤ect of "after Canseco" increases
from 0.97 to 1.97 for home runs, 3.14 to 5.74 for strikeouts, and 2.98 to 5.24 for RBIs.13
As noted above, higher values for these measures are indicative of a higher performing
“power hitter”, which suggests that Canseco improved the performance of power hitters.
However, Table 4 again reveals no signi…cant impact of playing with Canseco at the
same time. The reason why playing with Canseco has a much smaller e¤ect than playing
“after Canseco” may be due to the idea, mentioned above, that players who learn about
steroids from Canseco do not take steroids during the whole time they are playing “with
Canseco,” but do use them during the entire time that they are former teammates with
him. Alternatively, it may take some time for Canseco’s positive e¤ect to be realized,
or this pattern may be due to the fact that players who play with him spend more of
their time as former teammates of Canseco than being current teammates of him. For
example, power hitters who played at least one season with Canseco in our sample spent
15 percent of their seasons on a team with Canseco and 39 percent of their seasons being
former teammates with him. Also, the smaller e¤ect of playing with Canseco may be due
to the idea that Canseco took away scarce team resources such as playing time, attention
from coaches and trainers, etc. If this were true, then similar peer e¤ects should be found
for other baseball stars. As we show later, we do not …nd similar e¤ects for other stars,
which casts doubt on the hypothesis that star players “crowd out” the performance of
13The results are very similar if we control for managerial quality with 193 dummy variables for each
manager instead of the manager’s lifetime winning percentage. The coe¢cient for homeruns in Table 4
becomes 1.94 with a standard error of 0.61 (the coe¢cient in Table 4 is 1.97 with a standard error of 0.59).
In addition, similar …ndings are obtained if we restrict the sample to years in which the player had at least
200 times at-bat – the coe¢cient becomes 1.67 with a standard error of 0.72. However, since the number
of at-bats is an outcome which we will show later to be endogenous to playing with Canseco, we prefer to
keep the sample restricted to years with at least 50 at-bats.
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other players. If, however, we do not di¤erentiate between current and former players by
using one variable which indicates whether the player either plays currently or in the past
with Canseco, the coe¢cient for home runs is 1.40, and is still highly signi…cant with a
standard error of 0.52.
The coe¢cients in Table 4 are signi…cant not only in the statistic sense, but also in
terms of their magnitudes. The estimated e¤ect of playing “after Canseco” on home runs
is 1.97, which is 20% of the mean home run production of power hitters (9.83) displayed
in Table 1. After playing with Jose Canseco, a typical power hitter is also estimated to
increase his RBIs by 12 percent (a coe¢cient of 5.24 compared to the mean RBIs of 42.38).
Apparently, the bene…ts of playing with Canseco were quite large.
Table 5 presents additional results for power hitters using alternative measures of
performance. The …rst three columns show that Canseco had no discernible e¤ect on steals,
…elding percentage, and …elding errors. Neither of these outcomes is considered particularly
important for power hitting, nor are they typically thought of as being a¤ected by physical
strength. So, the lack of any e¤ect for these outcomes strengthens the interpretation of
the results in Table 4 that Canseco had a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on the hitting power
of his former teammates by a¤ecting their physical strength.
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 show that power hitters signi…cantly increase their
playing time (number of times at-bat and number of games played in a season) after playing
with Canseco.14 Contrary to the outcomes in the …rst three columns, playing time should
increase for a power hitter if his hitting prowess has improved.15 The e¤ect of Canseco
on playing time could be a reason why we see several power hitting performance measures
increase in Table 4 after playing with Canseco. For example, a power hitter will naturally
tend to hit more home runs and RBIs if they have more chances at bat. The …nal column
of Table 5 re-runs the regression for home runs but controls for the number of at-bats.
In comparison to the results in Table 4 which did not control for the number of at-bats,
14Since playing time is clearly an endogenous outcome which seems to be a¤ected by Canseco, our
preferred speci…cation does not include playing time as a control variable.
15Also, Canseco claimed that steroids help players recover from injuries faster, which could also increase
playing time. In his personal case, he claimed that steroids extended his career by enabling him to play
with serious back problems.
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the results are much smaller but still statistically signi…cant. That is, a player’s home run
production increases after playing with Canseco even if we condition on the number of
chances at bat.
We now turn our attention to see if Canseco had a similar e¤ect on other types of
players (not power hitters). The upper panel of Table 6 runs similar regressions for a sample
of skilled position players (not pitchers or power hitters) and pitchers. The results indicate
that skilled position players did not increase their home run production after playing
with Canseco, but they did signi…cantly increase their batting average.16 Canseco had no
discernible e¤ect on …elding percentage and steals. These results suggest that Canseco had
no e¤ect on measures which clearly should not be a¤ected by steroids (…elding percentage
and perhaps steals), but did have an e¤ect on an outcome which is very important for
these types of players (batting average). The last two columns of Table 6 indicate that
Canseco had no e¤ect on the main performance measure for pitchers, the ERA. However,
Canseco did increase a pitcher’s playing time, indicated by a signi…cant coe¢cient of 8.96
on innings pitched, which represents a nine percent increase relative to the mean number
of innings played by pitchers in our sample. This pattern of results is again consistent with
the idea that Canseco had an e¤ect by in‡uencing the physical strength of his teammates
– which is more likely to a¤ect a pitcher’s endurance relative to his ERA.
4 The Peer E¤ect of Similar Players
Having established that Canseco had a positive e¤ect on power hitters and players in
other roles (pitchers and position players), we now examine whether other baseball stars
of the same era generated similar e¤ects on their teammates. To allow for the possibility
that other players may also generate a positive e¤ect by transmitting knowledge about
steroids, we estimate the peer e¤ect of those that were named by Jose Canseco in his
book. In addition, we estimate the peer e¤ect for Ken Caminiti who acknowledged that he
took steroids during the height of his career. For the sake of a simple comparison, we also
present results for three famous players who have never been mentioned as being involved
16Although not reported, very similar results are obtained for "on-base percentage". For position
players, the coe¢cient is 0.009 (s.e. 0.004) for batting average and 0.008 (s.e. 0.004) for on-base percentage.
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in steroid use: Ken Gri¤ey Jr., Ryne Sandberg, and Cecil Fielder. As shown in Table 2,
all of the players are similar in the sense of having outstanding careers. Later, we will
systematically choose 26 players who had similar careers as Jose Canseco, and compare
the results for Canseco to those obtained for all 26 players.
Table 7 presents the results for power hitters using the same regression speci…cation
used to estimate the peer e¤ect of Jose Canseco, but using one of the ten other players
instead of Jose Canseco as the independent variable. One striking pattern that emerges
is that many of the coe¢cients are negative, in contrast to the results for Canseco which
are positive on most outcomes. The second striking pattern is that very few coe¢cients
are signi…cant, again in contrast to Canseco where most of the coe¢cients are signi…cant.
In fact, not one coe¢cient among the seventy presented for the other players (10 players
across 7 outcomes) is positive and signi…cant, in contrast to four out of seven for Canseco.
Therefore, it is clear that the results for Jose Canseco are very unusual in comparison to
players who had similar careers and even players who are suspected to have used steroids
(Caminiti and Giambi admitted to steroid use, and Palmeiro tested positive in 2005).
Furthermore, this analysis shows that the statistically signi…cant results for Canseco are
not simply a product of a large sample size, since the same sample was used to analyze
the peer e¤ect of the other ten players.
The bottom panel of Table 6 presents a similar analysis for non-power hitters and
pitchers. In contrast to the upper panel of Table 6 which showed a positive e¤ect of
Canseco on batting average and innings pitched, only one of the ten other baseball stars
(Palmeiro) had a positive e¤ect on these measures of performance. However, in contrast
to Canseco, Palmeiro had a seemingly negative e¤ect on the performance of power hitters
in Table 7. The other players exhibit no signi…cant positive e¤ect for any measure of
performance, so once again, Jose Canseco seems to be unusual in terms of his e¤ect on
peers.
To check the robustness of the results, we now systematically choose a sample of
power-hitting players who were comparable to Jose Canseco. Canseco made his professional
debut in 1985, so we restrict our sample to players that started their career between 1981
and 1989. Next, we take only those players who are either on the top 100 list of career home
13
runs or those that were home run hitting champions for any given year between 1985 and
2001 (for either league). Players on the all-time list obviously had great careers, while
those that were hitting champions in a given year had at least one spectacular season.
Jose Canseco matches both of those criteria, as do several other players on the …nal list.
Table 8 shows the …nal list of 27 players and indicates which criteria they matched to
be included in the sample. The sample includes 7 players that we already examined
(Canseco, Gri¤ey Jr., Fielder, Sandberg, McGwire, Palmeiro, and Gonzalez) and 20 new
players. The estimated peer e¤ect of each one of these players is presented in Table 9, which
shows the estimated e¤ect of each player on …ve di¤erent performance measures for power
hitters (home runs, strikeouts, intentional walks, RBIs, and slugging percentage) and two
performance measures for position players (batting average and slugging percentage).
Table 9 shows once again how strikingly di¤erent Jose Canseco is from the rest of this
elite group of players. The estimated e¤ect for Canseco is positive and signi…cant for four of
the seven outcomes. For the other 26 players, only 7 percent of the coe¢cients are positive
and signi…cant at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, the coe¢cients that are positive and
signi…cant are scattered among many players, which means that the other outcomes for
these players are either not signi…cant or negative. With the possible exception of Williams,
there is no other player that has a systematically large and signi…cant positive e¤ect across
several outcomes. A few players do reveal a systematic pattern, but the pattern indicates a
negative e¤ect on other players. This seems to be the case for Gri¤ey, Bonds, Sosa, Belle,
Gaetti, and Palmeiro. These players are considered among the best within the 27 players
listed in Table 9, so once again, the completely opposite pattern for Canseco accentuates
how truly unique he was.
It is important to note that our …ndings refute the idea that a common shock to
all players in the same environment is responsible for the estimated peer e¤ect of Jose
Canseco. In general, the identi…cation of a peer e¤ect is di¢cult to disentangle from
common shocks or unobserved characteristics shared by a group of people. However,
there are several indications that this is not driving our results. First, Canseco played on
ten di¤erent teams throughout his career, and the evidence is consistent with his claims
to have injected steroids into the six named players during his tenure with at least three
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teams. Second, the positive e¤ect of Canseco on his peers shows up after they no longer
play with him, and therefore, play for various teams across the league. A common,
sustained shock across various teams which a¤ects only former teammates of Jose Canseco
is highly unlikely. Third, although team managers may have surrounded Canseco with
certain types of players, it remains a mystery why a team would do this only for Canseco
and not the other 30 comparable power-hitters that we checked, and it is not likely that a
manager would have the incentive or foresight to build a team around players that would
signi…cantly improve their performance after they no longer play with Jose Canseco. In
addition, the analysis includes a …xed-e¤ect for each player, which means that changes
in the composition of players should not drive any of our results, since we are exploiting
variation over time “within” the career of each player rather than variation across players.
Finally, we found no evidence of similar peer e¤ects for six power-hitters who played with
Canseco and shared the same coaches and team characteristics. Taken as a whole, these
…ndings present strong evidence that the e¤ect is coming from Canseco and not the shared
characteristics of the team or the endogenous decisions of team managers.
5 The Peer E¤ect in the Drug Testing Era (Post-
2003)
In 2003, Major League Baseball introduced random drug testing to crack down on the
rumored use of steroids by players. In 2004, penalties were introduced for those found
using steroids, and the results from this testing program showed a sharp drop in steroid
use from 2003 to 2004.17 These …ndings suggest that the peer e¤ect of Jose Canseco could
be di¤erent in the post-2003 era. To investigate this possibility, we perform a similar
analysis but include an interaction between the "after playing with Canseco" dummy with
a dummy variable for the years after 2003 (2004-2009). (Canseco stopped playing in 2001,
so we cannot include an interaction between "playing with Canseco" and a dummy variable
17Testing with penalties began in 2004 and became sti¤er in 2005. See
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/news/drug_policy.jsp?content=timeline. There is evidence that the drop
in use began in 2004: In response to the results of the 2004 drug tests, Selig (commissioner of baseball
from 1998) says “he’s "startled" by the drop in positive test results from 5-to-7 percent in 2003 to between
1-to-2 percent in 2004.”
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for years after 2003.)
Table 10 presents our earlier results and compares them to the new speci…cation
which allows the peer e¤ect of Canseco to change after 2003. The results across all out-
comes for power hitters and position players show a striking pattern: the peer e¤ect of
Canseco disappears completely after 2003. The coe¢cient on “after playing with Canseco”
becomes larger for every performance measure compared to our previous analysis, while
the interaction coe¢cient is negative for every outcome. A series of F-tests performed
on each outcome reveals that the "after Canseco" e¤ect in the post-2003 era (the sum of
the “after Canseco” coe¢cient and the coe¢cient on the interaction of “after Canseco”
with the post-2003 dummy) is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero for each outcome, while
the e¤ect in the pre-testing era is positive and signi…cant for most of the outcomes (home
runs, strikeouts, and RBIs for power hitters; and batting average for position players).
This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that Canseco improved the perfor-
mance of his peers prior to 2004 by passing on his knowledge of steroids, but this knowledge
became obsolete during the crackdown on steroid use in the post-2003 seasons. Further-
more, these …ndings suggest that our earlier analysis was biased downwards, since we
restricted the e¤ect of Canseco to be constant in the pre- and post-steroid testing peri-
ods. Evidence for this bias is provided by the increase in size and signi…cance of the
“after Canseco" coe¢cient for every performance measure. Overall, the results in Table
10 present supporting evidence that Canseco did improve the performance of his peers
through his steroid knowledge, and that steroid testing has proved to be an e¤ective tool
to contain the use and spread of unethical behavior by players to gain a competitive ad-
vantage.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that Jose Canseco had a signi…cant e¤ect on his former team-
mates. Speci…cally, we …nd that Canseco had a positive impact on outcomes such as home
runs, strikeouts, RBIs, base-on-balls, and playing time. The pattern of results are all in-
dicative of increased power hitting performance. In addition, we …nd a positive e¤ect of
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Canseco on the endurance of his fellow pitchers. For all measures of performance, how-
ever, the positive e¤ect of Canseco disappears after 2003, the year that drug testing was
implemented. In this manner, the results are consistent with Jose Canseco’s claims that
he helped his teammates increase their physical strength by introducing them to steroids,
since physical strength is considered an important factor in hitting power and physical
endurance.
We have no direct evidence, however, that Jose Canseco’s teammates learned about
steroids directly or indirectly from him. We do know that the evidence strongly supports
his claims that he improved the physical strength of his teammates, but we have no proof
that the mechanism responsible for this e¤ect was steroids. It is possible that his teammates
learned about strength conditioning or other work habits. However, this paper provides
the …rst systematic study which shows that the evidence is consistent with Canseco’s
accusations. In particular, our …ndings support his claims that he started a contagion
of steroid use in the late 1980’s by teaching his peers and trainers about the bene…ts
and technology of performance enhancing drugs. The Mitchell Report (2007) provides
additional controversial evidence on the widespread use of steroids in baseball, but almost
all of the evidence concerned current players or drug use in the last …ve to ten years. The
Mitchell Report (2007) is silent on how the epidemic was ignited in the late 1980’s and
early 1990’s, and does not o¤er any indication of whether steroids are e¤ective or not.
In fact, the report cites evidence (page 9) which indicates that the use of human growth
hormone is not e¤ective at all. Our …ndings are consistent with Canseco’s claims that
steroids and human growth hormone are highly e¤ective, and that he was at the forefront
of transmitting the technology of how to use them throughout professional baseball in
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. As a result, our study supports recent …ndings on the
e¤ectiveness of steroid use, while being the …rst to examine the transmission of steroid use
among players.18
18Schmotzer, Kilgo, and Switchenko (2008, 2009) and Addona and Roth (2010) use the players mentioned
in Mitchell report to …nd a positive impact of steroids on the performance of batters (runs created) and
pitchers (pitch velocity), respectively. Schmotzer, Kilgo, and Switchenko (2009) …nd that steroid use
increase hitting power by about 18 percent, which is very similar in magnitude to our …ndings. Addona
and Roth (2010), in addition, …nd evidence that human growth hormone is used in recovery (a negative
correlation with velocity). This is consistent with our …ndings about increased innings pitched. De Vany
17
Even though we do not provide direct evidence of steroid use, the evidence is not
consistent with other explanations. This is best illustrated by our …ndings that no other
player seems to have a¤ected his teammates in the way that Jose Canseco did. After
checking to see whether 30 other power-hitting stars a¤ected their teammates, we …nd
that none of them exhibited anything close to what we see with Jose Canseco. Across
several outcomes that are indicative of being a good power hitter, Jose Canseco had a
strong and signi…cant impact. For the 30 other players, hardly any of the e¤ects were
signi…cant, and most of the coe¢cients that were signi…cant were in the opposite direction
(decreasing the performance of their peers). Clearly, Jose Canseco had a very unusual e¤ect
in comparison to players who had similar careers and even players who are suspected of
using steroids. That is, Canseco is not just generally di¤erent from everyone else, but he
appears to be unique even among known steroid users (Caminiti, Giambi, and Palmeiro).
Therefore, if the source of the e¤ect that Canseco apparently had on his teammates’ batting
power was due to something other than steroids (work ethic, batting techniques, weight
training regimen, etc.), why do we not see similar positive e¤ects from other elite players
on their peers as well? Moreover, why does the positive peer e¤ect of Canseco disappear
after drug testing was introduced in 2003?
All of this evidence points to the powerful e¤ect one worker can have on many other
co-workers. This particular case demonstrates how a “peer e¤ect” could be generated by
one worker increasing the productivity of other workers, rather than working through be-
havioral channels such as peer pressure, shame, guilt, etc. Furthermore, this is a case where
the mechanism is likely to involve unethical means. As the literature on crime suggests,
unethical behavior by one person can cause others to follow suit.19 In the context of the
workplace, once one worker starts doing it, he may obtain a competitive advantage which
can only be neutralized by other workers doing the same. This phenomenon could explain
the widespread use of performance-enhancing drugs in other sports like cycling and track
(2010) shows that the home run increase in recent years is consistent with a Pareto distribution (leading
to geniuses), and therefore, is not necessarily due to steroid use. Dinardo and Winfree (2010) show that
De Vany’s …ndings does not rule out that steroid use could also be behind the increase.
19See Glaeser et al. (1996). Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen (2009) show that criminals may acquire
criminal human capital from each other while serving in jail.
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and …eld. Outside the world of sports, similar forces may be at work in terms of accounting
practices, unprofessional behavior by lawyers, overly aggressive subprime lending, political
corruption, public disclosures, cheating by students, accuracy in journalism, reporting in
academic research, etc.
By demonstrating that unethical practices can spread through a contagion e¤ect,
our analysis leads to several potential policy implications. The most obvious policy impli-
cation is to increase the punishment on individuals practicing unethical behavior and/or
transferring their knowledge of such practices to other workers. In addition, policies could
be designed speci…cally to stop the spread of unethical behavior among workers. In par-
ticular, the …rm (or trade organization) could reward individuals for reporting unethical
practices of other workers. For example, under IRC Section 7623, the IRS authorizes the
payment to those reporting tax evasion of up to 30% of the tax recovered (see Hesch, 2009).
This kind of policy could be e¤ective through two channels: it would reduce incentives to
engage in questionable activity, and if the worker does engage in such behavior, the worker
would be more likely to keep the information to himself rather than share it with others.
That is, this policy could be e¤ective even if there are few instances of actual reporting.
Another possible way of containing a contagion is the use of group punishment for the ac-
tions of individual workers. If a …rm is punished for the unethical practices of a workers,
then the …rm is more likely to increase its monitoring of workers and will be more likely to
punish, rather than reward, questionable practices which may give the …rm a competitive
advantage. Group punishment is also likely to produce peer pressure among workers to
avoid unsavory tactics.
Overall, this paper highlights the idea that in the absence of a rigid and persistent
enforcement mechanism and proper policies, there could be a contagion of unethical be-
havior. This can be caused by a general degeneration of social norms, spread of knowledge
or skill, or from market forces creating a “rat race” where workers are willing to do just
about anything to remain competitive.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  
Power Hitters 
  
Position Players 
 
  
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
  
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Home Runs 
 
9.83 9.87  6.87 8.11 
Strikeouts 
 
53.51 34.27  49.79 31.43 
RBIs 
 
42.38 31.26  37.40 26.94 
Slugging Percent 
 
0.401 0.087  0.364 0.079 
Batting Average (BA) 
 
0.258 0.040  0.253 0.038 
Intentional Walks 
 
3.28 4.42  2.32 3.17 
Base On Balls 
 
32.52 25.02  30.76 22.69 
Steals 
 
6.26 10.61  7.03 9.99 
Fielding Percent 
 
0.983 0.020  0.968 0.019 
Errors 
 
6.17 5.31  10.86 7.17 
At-Bats 
 
312.51 176.36  335.33 181.69 
Games 
 
99.07 41.01  103.56 41.26 
Ever with Canseco 
 
0.108 0.310  0.112 0.315 
Currently with Canseco 
 
0.016 0.127  0.018 0.132 
Division Slugging Pct.  
 
0.417 0.025  0.418 0.025 
Manager Winning Pct. 
 
0.500 0.042  0.500 0.042 
Ballpark Hitting Factor 100.20 4.59  100.14 4.64 
      
Observations 11,397  5,820 
      
  Pitchers  
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
 
Earned Run Average 
 
 4.26  1.48  
Innings Pitched  
 
100.75  68.95  
Ever with Canseco 
 
 0.115  0.319  
Currently with Canseco  0.018  0.135  
      
Observations  14,214  
Table 2:  Mean Performance Measures for Nine Baseball Stars  
  
Home 
Runs 
 
Batting 
Average 
 
Slugging 
Pct. 
 
RBIs 
 
Strike-
outs 
 
Intent-
ional 
Walks 
 
 
Base on 
Balls 
 
Jose 
Canseco 
 
 
28.25 
 
0.268 
 
0.515 
 
85.06 
 
117.50 
 
3.81 
 
55.62 
Rafael  
Palmeiro 
 
28.45 0.286 0.511 91.75 67.40 8.55 67.65 
Jason 
Giambi 
 
27.27 0.274 0.509 88.67 92.53 5.87 84.13 
Mark 
McGwire 
 
36.44 0.262 0.584 88.38 99.75 9.38 82.31 
Juan 
Gonzalez 
 
27.13 0.285 0.531 87.75 79.56 4.63 28.56 
Ivan 
Rodriguez 
 
16.05 0.297 0.469 66.53 72.63 3.32 25.63 
Ken 
Caminiti 
 
15.93 0.267 0.439 65.53 77.53 7.40 48.47 
Dave 
Martinez 
 
5.36 0.264 0.370 36.00 57.43 3.07 36.50 
Ken 
Griffey Jr. 
 
30.00 0.280 0.533 87.10 83.90 11.71 62.05 
Ryne 
Sandberg 
 
18.80 0.283 0.448 70.73 83.93 3.93 50.73 
Cecil 
Fielder 
 
24.54 0.251 0.472 77.54 101.23 5.85 53.31 
        
 
All Power 
Hitters 
 
9.83 
 
0.258 
 
0.401 
 
42.38 
 
53.51 
 
3.28 
 
32.52 
Table 3: The Effect of Canseco on Hitting Statistics for All Non-Pitchers 
  
Home 
Runs 
 
Strikeouts 
 
RBIs 
 
Slugging 
Percentage 
 
 
Batting 
Average 
 
Intentional 
Walks 
 
Base on 
Balls 
 
 
Playing with  -0.156 -3.464* -1.112 0.002 0.003 -0.154 -1.193 
Canseco (0.487) (1.846) (1.631) (0.005) (0.003) (0.252) (1.280) 
 
After Playing 0.966** 3.143* 2.979** 0.006 0.004* 0.376 1.657 
with Canseco (0.444) (1.686) (1.490) (0.005) (0.002) (0.230) (1.169) 
 
Individual  
Fixed-Effects 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies 
for Each League  
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
P-value on  
F-statistic 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.033 
 
0.658 
 
0.106 
 
0.053 
 
0.000 
Observations = 17217       
Players = 2732       
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, and ** indicates significance at the 
5% level.   Each column represents a separate regression, with the dependent variable indicated at the top of the 
table.  The sample includes data from the 1970 to 2009 seasons.  Jose Canseco has been deleted from the sample.  
Year dummies are included for every year in each league.  The “additional controls” include the player’s number 
of years in the league (tenure), tenure squared, slugging percentage for each division in each year (not including 
the player’s own team), manager’s lifetime winning percentage, and ballpark hitting factor.  The p-value is for 
the f-statistic which tests the hypothesis that all the coefficients (except for the league-year dummies) are 
identical for power hitters and position players. 
Table 4: The Effect of Canseco on Hitting Statistics for Power Hitters 
 
  
Home 
Runs 
 
Strikeouts 
 
RBIs 
 
Slugging 
Percentage 
 
 
Batting 
Average 
 
Intentional 
Walks 
 
Base on 
Balls 
 
 
Playing with  0.643 -1.194 0.605 0.003 0.002 -0.036 0.546 
Canseco (0.638) (2.316) (2.100) (0.006) (0.003) (0.333) (1.616) 
 
After Playing 1.974** 5.738** 5.236** 0.007 0.001 0.482 3.027** 
with Canseco (0.588) (2.137) (1.937) (0.006) (0.003) (0.308) (1.491) 
 
Individual  
Fixed-Effects 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Dummies 
for Each League  
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations = 11397       
Players = 1816       
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, and ** indicates significance at the 
5% level.   Each column represents a separate regression, with the dependent variable indicated at the top of the 
table.  The sample includes data from the 1970 to 2009 seasons.  The sample is composed of "power position" 
players which include players who spent a majority of their career in the following positions: catcher, first base, 
designated hitter, and the outfield.  Jose Canseco has been deleted from the sample.  Year dummies are included 
for every year in each league.    The “additional controls” include the player’s number of years in the league 
(tenure), tenure squared, slugging percentage for each division in each year (not including the player’s own team), 
manager’s lifetime winning percentage, and ballpark hitting factor.  
 
  
Table 5: The Effect of Canseco on other Performance Statistics for Power Players 
  
Steals 
 
Fielding 
Percentage 
 
Errors 
 
At-Bats 
 
Games 
Played 
 
  
Home 
Runs 
        
Playing with  -0.0385 -0.002 0.0870 -1.684 -0.833  0.701 
Canseco (0.666) (0.002) (0.440) (12.40) (3.090)  (0.469) 
 
After Playing 0.244 0.002 -0.276 30.25** 5.564*  0.919** 
with Canseco (0.614) (0.002) (0.406) (11.44) (2.851)  (0.433) 
 
At-bats 
      
0.035** 
       (0.000) 
 
Individual  
Fixed-Effects 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
        
Year 
Dummies for 
Each League  
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Additional 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations = 11397       
Players = 1816       
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, and ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level.   Each column represents a separate regression, with the dependent variable indicated at 
the top of the table.  The sample includes data from the 1970 to 2009 seasons.  The sample is composed of 
"power position" players which include players who spent a majority of their career in the following 
positions: catcher, first base, designated hitter, and the outfield.  Jose Canseco has been deleted from the 
sample.  Year dummies are included for every year in each league.    The “additional controls” include the 
player’s number of years in the league (tenure), tenure squared, slugging percentage for each division in 
each year (not including the player’s own team), manager’s lifetime winning percentage, and ballpark 
hitting factor.  
 
 
Table 6: The Effect of Canseco on the Performance Statistics for other Players 
  
Performance Measures for Skilled Positions 
 
  
Performance of 
Pitchers  
 
  
Home 
Runs 
 
 
Batting 
Average 
 
 
Slugging 
Percent 
 
Fielding 
Percentage 
 
Steals 
  
ERA 
 
Innings  
 
Playing 
with  -1.708** 0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.902  -0.096 -0.798 
Canseco (0.714) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.912)  (0.114) (3.924) 
 
 
After 
Playing  -0.764 0.009** 0.006 -0.002 -0.393  -0.131 8.961** 
with 
Canseco (0.641) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.819)  (0.103) (3.547) 
 
After Playing With: 
       
 
Palmeiro 0.798 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.001 1.657**  -0.178* 8.944** 
 (0.661) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.844)  (0.108) (3.729) 
Giambi 0.658 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.478  0.187 -0.418 
 (1.037) (0.007) (0.012) (0.003) (1.325)  (0.137) (4.748) 
McGwire -0.0826 -0.001 0.004 0.001 -2.399**  -0.129 -11.05** 
 (0.804) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (1.026)  (0.134) (4.637) 
Gonzalez 0.475 0.003 0.008 0.003 1.102  -0.0776 4.055 
 (0.670) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.856)  (0.112) (3.855) 
Rodriguez 1.072 0.006 0.0103 0.003 0.714  -0.144 -0.432 
 (0.758) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.967)  (0.128) (4.435) 
Martinez -0.669 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -1.241  0.0802 -0.525 
 (0.639) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.816)  (0.104) (3.594) 
Caminiti 0.544 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.762  0.0690 2.602 
 (0.820) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (1.052)  (0.126) (4.348) 
Griffey Jr. -0.389 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.394  -0.0201 -2.547 
 (0.772) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.986)  (0.124) (4.301) 
Sandberg -0.675 0.010 0.023** 0.002 1.250  0.0244 -5.659 
 (0.996) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (1.273)  (0.129) (4.463) 
Fielder 0.437 0.001 0.013 0.006** 0.295  -0.178* 8.944** 
 (0.894) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003) (1.141)  (0.108) (3.729) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Each column in the upper panel of the table represents a separate 
regression, with the dependent variable indicated at the top of the table. * indicates significance at the 10% 
level, and ** indicates significance at the 5% level.   Skilled position players include players who played a 
majority of seasons in the following positions: second base, third base, and shortstop. The sample is from the 
1970 to 2009 seasons.  The sample size for position players is 5,820 which includes panel data on 916 
players. The sample of pitchers includes 14,214 observations and 2,695 players. The control variables for 
each regression are those described in Table 3. In the lower panel of the table, each coefficient comes from a 
separate regression which is specified similarly to the ones in the top panel but use the indicated player 
instead of Jose Canseco as the treatment variable.  ERA stands for "earned run average." 
  
Table 7: The Effect of other Great Power Hitters on other Power Position Players 
  
Home Runs 
 
Strikeouts 
 
RBIs 
 
Slugging 
Percentage 
 
Batting 
Average 
 
Intentional 
Walks 
 
At-Bats 
 
After Playing with: 
      
 
Canseco  1.974** 5.738** 5.236** 0.007 0.001 0.482 30.25** 
 (0.588) (2.137) (1.937) (0.006) (0.003) (0.308) (11.44) 
Palmeiro -1.962** -6.565** -7.173** -0.015** -0.008** -0.726* -45.27** 
 (0.709) (2.582) (2.338) (0.007) (0.004) (0.371) (13.82) 
Giambi -0.831 -2.609 -1.959 -0.001 -0.004 -0.205 -15.20 
 (0.809) (2.943) (2.666) (0.008) (0.004) (0.423) (15.76) 
McGwire -0.277 1.004 -1.602 0.007 -0.002 0.326 3.288 
 (0.782) (2.853) (2.586) (0.008) (0.004) (0.410) (15.29) 
Gonzalez -0.834 -3.682 -3.819* -0.001 -0.002 -0.0783 -19.16 
 (0.622) (2.262) (2.047) (0.006) (0.003) (0.326) (12.11) 
Rodriguez -0.129 -0.493 -2.207 0.011 0.004 -0.166 -14.95 
 (0.689) (2.501) (2.267) (0.007) (0.004) (0.360) (13.39) 
Martinez -0.536 -6.193** -3.685* -0.003 -0.001 0.0356 -23.23** 
 (0.582) (2.113) (1.916) (0.006) (0.003) (0.304) (11.31) 
Caminiti -1.321* -2.045 -5.293** -0.012* -0.006* -1.134** -18.29 
 (0.705) (2.563) (2.322) (0.007) (0.004) (0.368) (13.72) 
Griffey Jr. -2.889** -10.83** -7.929** -0.008 -0.001 -1.075** -56.87** 
 (0.732) (2.668) (2.415) (0.007) (0.004) (0.383) (14.27) 
Sandberg 0.927 -1.892 1.301 -0.004 -0.005 0.169 -19.63 
 (0.763) (2.771) (2.512) (0.008) (0.004) (0.399) (14.83) 
Fielder -1.365* -4.375 -0.233 -0.006 -0.001 -0.490 -1.727 
 (0.747) (2.715) (2.462) (0.008) (0.004) (0.391) (14.55) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, and ** indicates significance at 
the 5% level.   Each coefficient came from a separate regression which is specified similarly to the ones in 
Table 4 but use the indicated player instead of Jose Canseco as the treatment variable.  The displayed 
coefficient from each regression is for the variable "after playing with" the indicated player.   
 
Table 8: The Best Home-Run Hitters of Canseco's Era 
  
Debut 
Year 
 
Top 50 in 
Career 
Home Runs 
 
Top 51-100 
in Career 
Home Runs 
 
 
Years Led League in 
Home Runs (1985-
2001) 
 
Jose Canseco 1985 
 
X  AL88,AL91 
Rafael Palmeiro 1986 X   
Mark McGwire 
1986 X  
AL87,AL96,NL98,NL
99 
Juan Gonzalez 1989 X  AL92,AL93 
Ken Griffey Jr. 
1989 X  
AL94,AL97,AL98,AL9
9 
Barry Bonds 1986 X  NL93,NL01 
Sammy Sosa 1989 X  NL00 
Fred McGriff 1986 X  AL89,NL92 
Gary Sheffield 1988 X   
Cal Ripken Jr 1981 X   
Andres Galarraga 1985 X  NL96 
Joe Carter 1983 X   
Cecil Fielder 1985  X AL90, AL91 
Larry Walker 1989  X NL97 
Albert Belle 1989  X AL95 
Matt Williams 1987  X NL94 
Gary Gaetti 1981  X  
Greg Vaughn 1989  X  
Ellis Burks 1987  X  
Chili Davis 1981  X  
Darryl Strawberry 1983  X NL88 
Ron Gant 1987  X  
Ryne Sandberg 1981   NL90 
Jesse Barfield 1981   AL86 
Kevin Mitchell 1984   NL89 
Dante Bichette 1988   NL95 
Howard Johnson 1982   NL91 
The 27 players listed are the full sample of players that entered the league between 1981 and 1989 
and are currently in the top 100 list of players for career home runs or led one of the two leagues in 
home runs for at least one year between 1985 and 2001.  
 
Table 9: The Effect of the Best Home Run Hitters of Canseco's Era 
 Power Hitters  Position Players 
  
Home 
Runs 
 
Strike- 
outs 
 
Intent-
ional 
Walks 
 
RBIs 
 
Slugging 
Percent 
  
Batting 
Average 
 
Slugging 
Percent 
Canseco 1.974*** 5.738*** 0.482 5.236*** 0.007  0.009** 0.006 
 (0.588) (2.137) (0.308) (1.937) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Palmeiro -1.962*** -6.565** -0.726* -7.173*** -0.015**  0.013*** 0.024*** 
 (0.709) (2.582) (0.371) (2.338) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.007) 
McGwire -0.277 1.004 0.326 -1.602 0.007  -0.001 0.004 
 (0.782) (2.853) (0.410) (2.586) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.009) 
Gonzalez -0.834 -3.682 -0.078 -3.819* -0.001  0.003 0.008 
 (0.622) (2.262) (0.326) (2.047) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Griffey Jr. -2.889*** -10.832*** -1.075*** -7.929*** -0.008  -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.732) (2.668) (0.383) (2.415) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.009) 
Bonds -3.094*** -12.523*** -0.632** -10.080*** -0.015**  -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.650) (2.370) (0.317) (2.146) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.009) 
Sosa -1.660*** -9.795*** -0.743** -5.642*** -0.004  0.005 0.018** 
 (0.643) (2.344) (0.336) (2.124) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.007) 
McGriff -0.394 0.976 -0.356 -0.004 -0.002  -0.007 -0.015* 
 (0.636) (2.312) (0.332) (2.096) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.008) 
Sheffield -0.837 -5.920*** -0.623** -0.599 0.004  0.004 0.011 
 (0.587) (2.136) (0.307) (1.934) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Ripken Jr. -0.757 -3.493 -0.272 -2.556 -0.009  0.004 0.011 
 (0.777) (2.822) (0.406) (2.558) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Galarraga -1.197** -6.698*** 0.348 -2.936 -0.001  -0.005 -0.015** 
 (0.597) (2.169) (0.313) (1.968) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Carter 0.690 1.792 0.337 4.966** 0.005  0.002 0.005 
 (0.666) (2.422) (0.348) (2.193) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.009) 
Fielder -1.365* -4.375 -0.490 -0.233 -0.006  0.001 0.013 
 (0.747) (2.715) (0.391) (2.462) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Walker -1.148 -5.738** -0.733* -2.812 -0.003  -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.727) (2.642) (0.380) (2.394) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.008) 
Belle -1.368* -2.344 -0.898** -5.623** -0.013*  -0.012** -0.011 
 (0.704) (2.559) (0.368) (2.319) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.010) 
Williams 1.389** -0.258 1.690*** 1.247 0.020***  0.004 0.014 
 (0.615) (2.235) (0.321) (2.026) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.010) 
Gaetti -2.407*** -5.895** -0.252 -9.425*** -0.016**  -0.007 -0.018** 
 (0.632) (2.296) (0.330) (2.080) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.008) 
Vaughn -0.502 -1.291 -0.597* -0.807 -0.000  -0.002 0.001 
 (0.663) (2.411) (0.347) (2.185) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.009) 
Burks 0.834 0.905 0.977*** 1.606 0.010*  -0.004 -0.011 
 (0.596) (2.167) (0.312) (1.963) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.008) 
Davis 0.974 5.021** 0.004 3.294 0.016**  0.001 0.008 
 (0.629) (2.284) (0.328) (2.070) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.008) 
Strawberry -1.200* -3.515 0.369 -3.252 -0.007  -0.007 -0.016** 
 (0.686) (2.494) (0.359) (2.262) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.008) 
Gant -1.625** -2.919 -0.325 -4.548** -0.010  -0.010** -0.017** 
 (0.662) (2.405) (0.346) (2.181) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.007) 
Sandberg 0.927 -1.892 0.169 1.301 -0.004  0.010 0.023** 
 (0.763) (2.771) (0.399) (2.512) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.011) 
Barfield -1.137 -2.138 -0.014 -2.241 -0.015  0.009 -0.004 
 (1.013) (3.677) (0.530) (3.336) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.013) 
Mitchell 0.238 1.768 0.070 -0.472 -0.001  -0.002 0.006 
 (0.605) (2.201) (0.316) (1.994) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.008) 
Bichette 0.885 2.235 0.449 3.254 0.025***  -0.008* -0.015* 
 (0.662) (2.408) (0.346) (2.180) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.008) 
Johnson 0.291 -4.266* -0.650* -1.278 0.002  -0.001 0.002 
 (0.668) (2.425) (0.349) (2.199) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.008) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  Each coefficient came from a separate regression which is 
specified similarly to the ones in Table 4 but use the indicated player instead of Jose Canseco as the independent 
variable.  The displayed coefficient from each regression is for the variable "after playing with" the indicated player.  
The 27 players listed are the ones described in Table 8.  
Table 10: The Effect of Canseco before and after 2003 
 Power Hitters  Position Players 
  
Home 
Runs 
 
Strike- 
outs 
 
Intent-
ional 
Walks 
 
RBIs 
 
Slugging 
Percent 
  
Batting 
Average 
 
Slugging 
Percent 
 
After Playing  1.899*** 5.712*** 0.466 5.113*** 0.005  0.009** 0.005 
with Canseco (0.586) (2.127) (0.307) (1.929) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) 
         
         
After Playing  2.467*** 6.869*** 0.487 6.413*** 0.010  0.011*** 0.012 
with Canseco (0.613) (2.226) (0.320) (2.018) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) 
         
         
Post-2003* -2.392*** -5.485* -0.0285 -5.705** -0.015*  -0.008 -0.028** 
After Playing  (0.834) (3.031) (0.436) (2.748) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.011) 
With Canseco         
         
P-value on  
F-test for the 
sum of both 
coefficients 0.93 0.67 0.32 0.81 0.54  0.68 0.15 
         
Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  The coefficient in the upper panel (for each column) comes 
from a separate regression than the two coefficients in the bottom panel. Each regression includes the same control 
variables described in Table 4.  The reported p-value is for the F-test which tests for whether the sum of the two 
coefficients in the bottom panel equals zero. 
